University of Guilin University , veryashabrandi@gmail.com
Abstract: (34 Views)
This article analyzes the persistence of underdevelopment in Iran’s political economy through the integration of three theoretical frameworks, offering a conceptual model to explain the structural deadlock. First, the new institutional theory highlights the crucial role of formal and informal institutions in shaping developmental paths. It demonstrates that instead of inclusive institutions, Iran’s system is characterized by rent-seeking and monopolistic structures. Second, Nassim Nicholas Taleb’s concepts of “antifragility” and “black swan power” provide a lens for analyzing how systems respond to shocks and crises. While resilient systems grow stronger through adversity, Iran’s decision-making apparatus tends to react defensively, and elites are often insulated from the consequences of their decisions—lacking real “skin in the game.” Third, Alireza Ghali’s sociological analysis reveals how historical power blockage and the elimination of reformist elites have prevented modern institutionalization and the emergence of a developmental state. Collectively, the article argues that the combination of institutional inefficiency, the absence of antifragile mechanisms and transparency, the perpetuation of rentier economics, and the systematic removal of transformative elites has entrenched a self-reinforcing cycle of underdevelopment in contemporary Iran. Breaking this cycle requires structural institutional reform, equitable distribution of power, and mechanisms of accountability that bind decision-makers to the outcomes of their actions.